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Abstract
Paragraphs 68 to 72 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act No. 58
of 1962 (‘the Act’) were inserted to perform the same function as that of
section 7, namely to attribute income in cases in which the taxpayer has
disposed of that source of income by means of donation, settlement or
other disposition. Paragraph 73 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act was in-
serted to limit the total amount that is attributed to the donor in a year in
which both income (in terms of section 7) and a capital gain (in terms of
the attribution paragraphs 68 to 72) are to be attributed.
The unclear construction of the section and, it is submitted, the inaccu-
rate interpretation of this paragraph by the South African Revenue Serv-
ices (‘SARS’) has made it difficult to interpret this paragraph. This article
attempts to evaluate prevailing legal precedent and to apply such prece-
dent to the paragraphs on attribution in order to arrive at an appropriate
interpretation of paragraph 73. The approach adopted by SARS is also ex-
amined in the light of the above interpretation and application of prevail-
ing legal precedent. Lastly, amendments to the legislation are proposed to
clarify the legislation and to provide a structured approach in the consid-
eration of the intention of the legislature.
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1 Introduction
With the introduction of capital gains tax (with effect from 1 October 2001)
came provisions to mirror the effects of section 7 of the Income Tax Act No. 58
of 1962 (as amended) (hereinafter ‘the Act’). Section 7 attributes the income of
one person to another person as a result of a donation, settlement or other
disposition by the other person. Paragraphs 68 to 72 serve the same purpose as
section 7 with regard to capital gains.
The impact of section 7 has been effectively limited by case law in the case of
dispositions such as interest-free loans. Paragraph 73 was enacted with the
purpose of limiting attributions in those years of assessment in which both
income and capital gains are derived from such donations, settlements or other
dispositions. When examined, this provision in the Eighth Schedule to the Act
presents certain difficulties.
This article attempts to: (a) discuss the difficulties with the interpretation of
paragraph 73 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act in its current form, (b) examine
the position that the South African Revenue Service (‘SARS’) has taken with
regard to the attribution of capital gains and (c) propose an alternative formula-
tion to minimise the difficulties in determining limits in respect of the attribu-
tion of income and capital gains.
In order to understand the difficulties experienced in respect of paragraph 73,
it is first necessary to consider the income equivalent of the paragraphs on the
attribution of capital gains, namely section 7 of the Act, and the applicable case
law. In essence, Part X of the Eighth Schedule to the Act mirrors the wording of
section 7. Therefore the rules for the interpretation of section 7, which are
derived from case law, should be examined in the context of those paragraphs to
determine how the paragraphs are to be interpreted and therefore applied.
Finally, the order in which section 7 and the paragraphs within Part X of the
Eighth Schedule are to be applied should be determined before the actual
construction of paragraph 73 can be examined.
2 Interpretation of and critical court decisions
regarding section 7
The anti-avoidance provisions of section 7 of the Act provide for the attribution
of income to persons (hereinafter ‘the donor’) other than the person to whom or
by whom the amount is accrued or received (hereinafter ‘the beneficiary’) in
cases in which the income arises as a result of a donation, settlement or other
disposition by the donor.
The provisions of this section, particularly section 7(3), have been the subject
of significant discussion and case law. The phrases ‘donation, settlement and
other disposition’ and ‘by reason of’ are critical to the understanding of the
provisions of section 7. Both of these phrases have established meanings in
terms of the cases of Ovenstone (SATC 1980) and Joss (SATC 1979).
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The more recent case of Woulidge (SATC 2001) is of particular interpretative
importance as the decision in this case effectively places a limit on the extent to
which income can be attributed to the donor. It has previously been submitted
that this decision applies equally to the paragraphs in Part X of the Eighth
Schedule (West and Surtees 2002:265). This view is discussed and extended in
this paper.
While the cases that are considered mainly concern the application of the
provisions of section 7(3), it is submitted that the principles derived from these
cases apply equally, with regard to the critical phrases that are common to
section 7, to the rest of section 7 and the applicable paragraphs of the Eighth
Schedule. The principles derived from these cases are extracted and discussed in
brief below.
2.1 By reason of
Due consideration by the courts of the phrase ‘by reason of’ has resulted in the
interpretation that a causal link should exist between the income received or
accrued and the ‘donation, settlement or other disposition’ (hereinafter ‘gratui-
tous disposition’) originally made for section 7 to apply (SATC 1979:216). It is
apparent from the application of the provisions of section 7 that other phrases
that are used in the section (such as ‘in consequence of’) also connote a causal
link (SATC 1980:73).
Furthermore, it has been established by the courts that the phrase ‘by reason
of’ does indicate that apportionment should be considered when the income is
received or accrued as a result of elements of both full consideration and gra-
tuitousness.1 It is therefore accepted that only income that results from the
gratuitous element of the disposition should be considered in terms of the
provisions of section 7. It should be borne in mind that, in terms of section 82 of
the Act, the taxpayer has the onus of proving the apportionment of the income
between the full consideration and the gratuitous element. When the taxpayer
fails to discharge that onus, all the income will be allocated to the gratuitous
element rather than split between the elements of gratuitousness and full-
consideration.
________________________
1 Ovenstone at 77 states: ‘Now where the consideration, while not being due consideration,
is nevertheless appreciable, it will mean that the income in question under s 7(3) will usu-
ally have accrued or been received ‘by reason of’ both elements of gratuitousness and
consideration. I see no reason why in those circumstances the income should not then be
apportioned between the two elements. The words “by reason of”, themselves suggest
some apportionment in order to give proper effect to the real cause of the accrual or re-
ceipt of the income. (Cf Joss v SIR) If such apportionment is not possible, or if insufficient
evidence is adduced to enable the court to effect it (the burden of proof being on the tax-
payer under s 82), the composite disposal will usually, because of its appreciable element of
bounty, be then simply treated as a gratuitous settlement or disposition, as the case may be,
that falls within the scope of the critical phrase of ‘donation, settlement or other disposition.’
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2.2 Donation, settlement or other disposition
Following the judgments in the cases of Joss and Ovenstone, sufficient clarity
now exists regarding the interpretation of these terms by the courts. In essence,
the term ‘other disposition’ has been interpreted ejusdem generis with the terms
donation and settlement. The reason for this interpretation was provided suc-
cinctly in Joss (1979:212). This principle applies equally to transactions be-
tween persons other than minor children and parents with regard to the other
provisions of section 7.
Because the disposition should be interpreted ejusdem generis with the terms
donation and settlement, it was furthermore established that the disposition
should therefore contain an appreciable element of gratuity before the provi-
sions of section 7 can apply, that is the gratuity that arises as a result of negotia-
tion within a bona fide commercial transaction should be ignored (1980:76).
Subject to the onus placed on the taxpayer by section 82 of the Act, the trans-
actions that are proved by the taxpayer, to the satisfaction of the Commissioner
or, failing that, to the courts, to be sufficiently close to full money’s worth
(‘market value’) should, it is submitted, be excluded from the scope of section 7.
In the case of a sale (at market value) on an interest-free loan account, two
dispositions are present, namely the sale at full market value and the subsequent
loan of money. It follows that, as Coetzee J made clear in the case of Joss, there
should be certainty about which disposition is considered in terms of the provi-
sions of section 7. In the above scenario, only the interest-free loan is a gratui-
tous disposition for the purposes of section 7 to the extent that interest is not
charged on the loan account, because the quantum of income received by the
purchaser of the asset that is sold is enhanced as a result of that fact that the
seller does not charge interest on the loan account. The sale, while being a
disposition, is not a gratuitous disposition, because the sale price was an arm’s
length price (leaving no element of gratuity).
The case of Ovenstone provided clarity on the legislative purpose of the pro-
visions of section 7. In this regard Trollip JA stated that:
The transactions which the legislature seems to have had in mind in enacting subsecs (3) –
(6) are those in which a taxpayer seeks to achieve tax avoidance by donating, or disposing
of income-producing property to or in favour of another under the therein specified condi-
tions or circumstances, thereby diverting its income from himself without his replacing or
being able to replace it. But if he receives due consideration for the disposition, theoreti-
cally he is able to replace such income, and in practice he often does, by using or investing
the consideration.
It is clear from the above statement by Trollip JA that, in the case of a sale (at
market value) of an asset on an interest-free loan account, the sale has no gra-
tuitous element. However, the income derived from the asset that had previously
been held is not replaced, despite the taxpayer being in a position to replace the
income by charging interest on the loan account. Because the donor does not
replace the income by charging interest on the loan account, the income (to the
extent that the income represents forgone interest – see 2.3 below) is attributable
to the donor.
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2.3 Limitation of the income attributed in terms of
section 7
After identifying the gratuitous element of the disposition, the quantum of such
gratuitousness should then be established to determine the amount of income to
be attributed. In Joss, Coetzee J provided the first indication of the determina-
tion of the quantum of the gratuitous element when he stated that:
It is, however, illogical to suggest that only the interest which normally would have been
paid in respect of the tax year in question affects the dividend. Obviously the interest-free
loans during the preceding years also affect the quantum of the dividend received by
Nicolle and the trust in the tax years under discussion (SATC 1979:216).
At the first reading, this comment by Coetzee J appears to imply that, in a case
of a sale on an interest-free loan account, the interest forgone represents the
gratuitous element of the transaction and that, in the years in which the income
of the asset is less than the notional interest that should have been charged on
the loan account, such excess is to be capitalised to create a new notional capital
balance on which notional interest is to be determined for the following year of
assessment. Such an approach would lead to exponential growth of the identi-
fied gratuitous element when the income from the asset sold on an interest-free
loan account continues to yield less than a market-related interest rate.
Coetzee J’s comment in Joss was quoted with approval in the Cape Provincial
Division in C:SARS v Woulidge in which Davis J considered the application of
the in duplum rule (SATC 1999:13-14) and was similarly supported by Seliko-
witz J in the same case (SATC 1999: 14-15).
The statements made by Davis J and Selikowitz J in support of Coetzee J set a
disturbing precedent of capitalisation of notional interest that represents the
gratuitous element and therefore determines the extent of the income to be
attributed in terms of section 7. However, in the judgement of Froneman AJA in
the Supreme Court of Appeal in C:SARS v Woulidge, the dissenting judgement
of Van Reenen J in the Cape Provincial Division was supported and the princi-
ple of capitalisation of notional interest found not to apply. In this regard Fro-
neman AJA stated that:
The respondent charged no interest on the loan that he advanced to the trusts. No actual
interest thus ever accumulated. A notional commercial arms length transaction would as-
sume a lender who would insist on payment of the interest he charges and a borrower able
to pay that interest (SATC 2001:489).
It is therefore clear that, should the asset that was sold on an interest-free loan
account yield less than a notional market-related interest rate, the excess no-
tional interest would not be accumulated in the determination of the benefit that
is gained by the beneficiary and attributable to the donor.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in C:SARS v Woulidge there-
fore provided the taxpayer with a method of limiting the income attributable in
terms of the provisions of section 7. It is submitted that the approach of Seliko-
witz J was partially correct. To identify the gratuitous element, the actual
transaction should be considered in terms of normal commercial principles.
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However, the caveat added by Froneman AJA is that the circumstances of the
actual transaction should not be overlooked and therefore not all normal com-
mercial principles can be applied stringently.
The decision in Woulidge concerned the use of interest-free loans and, it is
submitted, the method of limiting the attribution of income can only be deter-
mined on this basis when interest-free loans are used, i.e. the decision in
Woulidge does not determine a limit for the income that arises from assets that
are donated.
Further support for the decision of Froneman AJA regarding the excess no-
tional interest that falls away can be found in the Ovenstone judgement. In
Ovenstone, Trollip JA made it clear that the section served to prevent the donor
from diverting his income. Should the limit (represented by the interest forgone)
exceed the actual income produced by the asset that is sold on an interest-free
loan account, it is clear that the income to be attributed can only be the maxi-
mum of the actual income yielded by the asset that was previously held by the
donor. The notional interest that is forgone is not intended to create income
where none exists, i.e. the income that is diverted is all that can be attributed.
For example, a donor sells shares that yield 6% per annum to a trust at a market
value of R2 million on an interest-free loan account. A market-related interest
rate for the loan account would be 15% per annum. The trust holds no other
assets and has no cash reserves. The limit to be applied to the income would be
a maximum of R300 0002, which is the interest forgone. However, because the
actual income is only R120 0003, the actual income is all that can be attributed
to the donor. The remaining limit of R180 000 should fall away, because the
purpose of section 7 was merely to prevent the donor from diverting his income.
Because only R120 000 was diverted, only R120 000 can be attributed to the
donor. It should always be borne in mind that the limit is notional and does not
represent an actual return on the loan account.
2.4 Summary of the principles for the interpretation of
section 7
The principles to be applied from the courts’ interpretation of section 7 can be
summarised as follows:
l The term ‘other disposition’ refers only to dispositions that have an appre-
ciable gratuitous element.
l Transactions executed at full value in money or money’s worth are not
included in the scope of section 7.
l Only income that has a causal link to the donation, settlement or other
disposition is considered in terms of the provisions of section 7.
________________________
2 R2 000 000 x 15% = R300 000
3 R2 000 000 x 6% = R120 000
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l Apportionment between the elements of full consideration and gratuity is
permitted.
l The income to be attributed (in the case of a sale at market value on an
interest-free loan account) is limited to the lesser of the notional interest on
the outstanding balance of the loan account and the actual income yielded
by the asset (in the same ratio as that of the outstanding balance of the loan
account to the original balance of the loan account).
l Should any limit remain, it falls away, because the purpose of section 7 is to
prevent the donor from diverting his income and not to create income where
none exists. Furthermore, the transaction assumes that there is a lender who
insists on payment and a borrower who is able to pay such interest.
3 Rules for the interpretation of section 7 and the
Eighth Schedule
Paragraphs 68 to 72 of the Eighth Schedule consider the attribution of capital
gains. These paragraphs have been formulated along the lines of the provisions
of section 7. It is submitted that the use of similar wording to section 7 has the
implication that the critical phrases contained in the paragraphs are used in the
same context as those contained in section 7, and should be given the same
meaning as that ascribed to those phrases by the court.
It is therefore submitted that the phrase ‘donation, settlement or other dispo-
sition’ refers to a disposition that is appreciably gratuitous (see the discussion in
part 2). Instead of the phrases ‘by reason of’ or ‘in consequence of’, the para-
graphs in the Eighth Schedule use the phrase ‘can be attributed to’. The Oxford
Paperback Dictionary definition of the word ‘attribute’ provides the following
meaning:
to regard as belonging to or caused by or originated by.
It is submitted that the legislature’s intention in using the phrase ‘can be attrib-
uted to’ and in particular the word ‘attributed’ was to indicate in clear language
that there should be a causal link between the donation, settlement or other
disposition and the capital gain before the paragraphs on attribution can be
applied. Therefore the court’s interpretation of the phrases ‘by reason of’ and ‘in
consequence of’ can, it is submitted, be applied similarly to the phrase ‘can be
attributed to’, which is used in the Eighth Schedule.
A critical question to be addressed in terms of the paragraphs on attribution in
the Eighth Schedule is: What is the gratuitous element of a sale on an interest-
free loan to which a capital gain may be attributed in terms of paragraphs 68
to 72?
3.1 Identification of the capital gratuitous element
As stated in part 2, Selikowitz J provided guidance on the determination of the
gratuitous element of a transaction, namely to compare the actual effects of the
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transaction with the effects that the same transaction would have if the normal
commercial principles applied. Froneman AJA refined this test by adding that
when the normal commercial principles are applied to an interest-free loan
regarding repayment, the assumption has to be made of a lender who insists on
payment and a borrower who is able to effect such payment, i.e. capitalisation of
notional amounts cannot be implied in the application of the normal commercial
principles.
If the abovementioned test were to be applied to the sale of a capital-growth
asset at market value on an interest-free loan account, it is submitted that the
following could be said to be true: A sale took place at full market value in
terms of two dispositions, namely the sale and the subsequent provision of loan
finance. The sale disposition, it is submitted, contains no gratuitous element for
the same reasons as those provided in part 2. This leaves the interest-free loan to
be considered. There appears to be no capital gratuitous element that is attribut-
able to the interest-free loan in accordance with the principle applied in the
judgement in Ovenstone, namely that, because the capital was replaced in full
(the asset having been replaced by the loan account), the taxpayer had not
diverted his capital and therefore the paragraphs on attribution should not apply.
An alternative interpretation may exist, provided that the taxpayer has diverted a
capital-growth asset for an asset that has no capital growth and therefore has not
replaced the capital in full. This alternative is discussed in a subsequent section
of this paper.
Does the fact that many of the above transactions of this type do not have
fixed-repayment terms, but only a clause referring to repayment on demand,
result in the entire interest-free loan being regarded as gratuitous? Is all the
capital growth therefore deemed to be attributable to appreciable gratuitousness?
In applying the test of Selikowitz J, the normal commercial principles should be
examined. A frequent commercial transaction, particularly in smaller compa-
nies, is a loan or loans from majority shareholders in which the repayment terms
are not fixed, but refer to repayment on demand. It is submitted therefore, if
such transactions are part of normal commercial practice, then repayment on
demand does not yield appreciable gratuitousness. Froneman AJA’s extension
of the test is therefore irrelevant, because repayments of capital will be made on
demand and it is not necessary to assume notional fixed terms of repayment of
capital that are set by a lender or a borrower who is able to meet such capital
repayments.
3.2 Application of interest foregone to a capital gain
Despite the above exposition, the question remains whether the interest that is
forgone can be applied to the capital gain that is derived subsequent to the sale
of an asset at market value on an interest-free loan account. The courts have
established that interest that is forgone on an interest-free loan represents the
gratuitous portion of that disposition. The interest that is forgone was applied to
the income that was earned by the asset that was sold on a loan account and the
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lesser of the actual income from that asset and the interest that was forgone was
attributed back to the donor. As pointed out in Ovenstone, the purpose of sec-
tion 7 is to prevent the taxpayer from diverting his income ‘without his replac-
ing or being able to replace it’. Any excess of interest that was forgone over the
actual income of the asset that was sold was disregarded. The query above can
be divided into two questions, namely:
1 Does interest that was forgone in the year of assessment in which the capital
gain is derived apply to such capital gain; or, alternatively
2 Does the excess of the interest that is forgone over the actual income that is
derived from the asset that was sold on an interest-free loan account accu-
mulate, and does this accumulated excess determine the attribution of the
capital gain?
It is submitted that interest forgone on the loan account should first be applied to
the income that is derived from the asset that was sold (in terms of section 7)
before it may be considered for application against capital gains. Therefore only
situations in which the notional interest income exceeds the income from the
asset that was sold on an interest-free loan account can be considered.
In the judgements of Joss, Ovenstone and Woulidge, the interest that was for-
gone was referred to as a ‘continuing donation’. Indeed, Froneman AJA referred
to the interest that is forgone as an annual donation of the interest that is not
charged. Does the use of the word ‘donation’ in this context provide the answer
to the application of the excess notional interest to capital gains?
The decisions in Widan and Berold established the principle that income-on-
income could still be attributed back to the original disposition. In his judgement
in C:SARS v Woulidge (1999:8), Davis J stated that the test of the causal link
was to ask the following question:
[Does the] gratuitous disposal constitute […] the real, substantive cause of income being
received by the minor child. If the answer is in the affirmative, that amount of income so
received or which accrues to the minor child will be deemed to be that of the donor parent.
It is submitted that the ‘donation’ of the interest that is forgone, after being
applied to the income of the asset that was sold on an interest-free loan account
and resulted in an attribution of income, falls away to the extent of the amount
attributed. Should any excess remain, does the ‘donation’ of this excess notional
interest have the effect of being a new gratuitous disposal, which is then the
cause of the capital gain? It is submitted that this interpretation has little merit.
Section 7 is concerned with actual gratuitous dispositions and not those notion-
ally created.
In ruling against the application of the in duplum rule, Froneman AJA showed
that capitalisation of the notional interest could not occur if it were assumed that
the borrower would be in a position to fund repayments of interest. While
caution should be exercised in applying this principle from a case that is distin-
guishable on the facts (because Froneman AJA was not considering a situation
that also encompassed capital gains), it is submitted that this principle still has
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merit. It has already been submitted that the capital has been replaced in full and
therefore no gratuitous element can be attributed to the capital on the date of
sale. It is furthermore submitted that the interest that is forgone can only be
applied to the income, following the ratio decidendi from Froneman AJA’s
judgement.
Alternatively, should the use of the phrase ‘continuing donation’ be applied to
consider the interest that is forgone as a new gratuitous disposal, it may then be
found that this ‘donation’ affects the capital growth of the asset directly. It is
submitted that an interpretation to this effect would result in complex calcula-
tions being made to determine the quantum of the gratuitous element, which is
either the notional donation or the notional interest that is forgone on the no-
tional donation or both. It is settled law that one may not shy away from an
interpretation merely because it results in complex calculations (SATC 1990:22).
However, it is submitted that the former approach, which is outlined below,
should, on its merits, be the preferred option.
3.3 The preferred approach
In summary, the following is submitted to be the preferred approach for the
interpretation of paragraphs 68 to 72:
l The term ‘other disposition’ refers only to dispositions that have an appre-
ciable gratuitous element.
l Transactions at full value in money or money’s worth are excluded from the
scope of paragraphs 68 to 72.
l Only capital that has a causal link to the donation, settlement or other
disposition is considered in terms of the provisions of paragraphs 68 to 72.
l Apportionment between the elements of consideration and gratuity is
permissible.
l The capital gain to be attributed is nil in the case of a sale at market value
on an interest-free loan account, because the sale itself is at full market
value and the asset has been replaced in full (i.e. there is no gratuity in re-
spect of the sale of the asset at market value).
l Upon the donation of a capital asset, the entire capital gain may be attrib-
uted back to the donor, because the capital has not been replaced in any
way.
l The excess of the interest that is forgone over the actual income of the asset
that was sold on an interest-free loan falls away in each year of assessment
and cannot be applied to the capital.
3.4 Attribution of a capital gain that arises from a
donation, settlement or other disposition
An alternative interpretation of the quote from Ovenstone regarding a taxpayer
who diverts income, when applied to capital, could be read as follows:
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The transactions which the legislature seems to have had in mind in enacting [paragraphs
68 to 72 of the Eighth Schedule] are those in which a taxpayer seeks to achieve tax avoid-
ance by donating, or disposing of [a capital growth] property to or in favour of another
under the therein specified conditions or circumstances, thereby diverting its [capital gain]
from himself without his replacing or being able to replace it. But if he receives due con-
sideration for the disposition, theoretically he is able to replace such [capital gain], and in
practice he often does, by using or investing the consideration’ (square brackets represent
substituted words).
There are inherent difficulties in reading ‘capital gain’ for ‘income’ in the above
context to derive a purpose for the paragraphs on attribution. Firstly, it would
appear from the above that unless a taxpayer changes to another investment that
has capital growth, the paragraphs on attribution would apply. However, this
interpretation ignores the possibility of legitimate changes of investment when a
taxpayer sells a capital-growth asset for an asset that has little or no capital
growth but yields a steady income stream. An extreme example of this nature
would be the sale of Krugerrands and the use of the proceeds to make a loan that
yields interest. The capital gain in this scenario is not replaced, but rather an
income stream is introduced. It is acknowledged that such a transaction would
not fall within the scope of Part X of the Eighth Schedule, because there is no
gratuitous element in the transaction in that scenario. However, the example of a
capital-growth asset that is replaced by an asset that has no capital growth in this
context demonstrates that it could not have been the intention of the legislature
to apply the paragraphs on attribution to the disposal of any asset that has capital
growth in cases in which the capital is replaced but the capital growth is not.
3.5 A final argument
There is a further argument for the non-application of Part X to sales on an
interest-free loan at full market value. The decision in Woulidge held that
income that is earned from an asset that was previously held by the donor could
be attributed back to the donor up to a maximum of the lesser of the actual
income from the asset that was previously held or the notional market-related
interest on the balance of the loan account. In applying the same principle to the
capital gain, it is submitted that the capital gain that may be attributed back to
the donor should be a maximum of the lesser of the actual capital gain of the
asset that was previously held and the notional capital gain on the interest-free
loan (which is nil). It is therefore submitted that no capital gain may be attrib-
uted back to the donor on a sale at market value on an interest-free loan account,
irrespective of whether any portion of the notional limit that is applied to in-
come remains. Because the capital has been replaced in full, there is no gratui-
tous element that may be applied to the capital gain.
4 Steps to be followed in the application of section 7
and part X of the Eighth Schedule
Having discussed section 7 and paragraphs 68 to 72 in isolation above, it is
necessary to determine the order in which these provisions are to be applied.
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Paragraph 73 is of some assistance in respect of determining the order in which
section 7 and paragraphs 68 to 72 are to be applied. Paragraph 73 is concerned
with the limitation of the amount to be attributed to a donor in a year of assess-
ment in which both income and a capital gain arise. Once the order of applica-
tion for the above-mentioned provisions has been determined, the provisions of
paragraph 73 may be examined.
Paragraph 73(1) provides some guidance in this regard. The paragraph pro-
vides that:
Where both an amount of income and a capital gain are derived by reason of or are attrib-
utable to a donation, settlement or other disposition, the total amount of that income and
gain–
(a) that is deemed in terms of section 7 to be that of a person other than the one to whom
it accrues or by whom it is received or for whose benefit it is expended or accumu-
lated; and
(b) that is attributed in terms of this Part to a person other than the one in whom it vests,
shall not exceed the amount of the benefit derived from that donation, settlement or other
disposition.’It is apparent from the above quotation that the provisions of section 7 and
paragraphs 68 to 72 should first be considered before paragraph 73 may be applied.
It is submitted that the provisions of section 7 should necessarily apply before
the provisions of paragraphs 68 to 72. This approach is derived from the basis of
the calculation of taxable income. In terms of this calculation, the taxpayer
should first determine his gross income, exempt income, and deductions against
such income, arriving at his taxable income before the addition of capital gains
to such taxable income in terms of s26A is considered. Therefore paragraph 73
is only considered after the appropriate tests, which are considered in section 7
and paragraphs 68 to 72, have been applied.
5 Limitation of the attribution of capital gains –
paragraph 73
Silke (De Koker 2002:24.195) and Stein (2002:11.10) both state that the provi-
sions of paragraph 73 are designed to provide relief to the taxpayer in the years
in which income and capital gains arise as a result of a donation, settlement or
other disposition. SARS also states in its Explanatory Memorandum that ac-
companied the introduction of capital gains tax that paragraph 73 limits the total
amount of income and capital gains that may be attributed to donations, settle-
ments or other dispositions in terms of the provisions of section 7 and para-
graphs 68 to 72 of the Eighth Schedule.
Paragraph 73 provides that:
(1) Where both an amount of income and a capital gain are derived by reason of or are
attributable to a donation, settlement or other disposition, the total amount of that in-
come and gain-
(a) that is deemed in terms of section 7 to be that of a person other than the one to
whom it accrues or by whom it is received or for whose benefit it is expended or
accumulated; and
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(b) that is attributed in terms of this Part to a person other than the one in whom it
vests,
shall not exceed the amount of the benefit derived from that donation, settlement or
other disposition.
(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, the benefit derived from a donation, settlement or
other disposition means the amount by which the person to whom that donation, set-
tlement or other disposition was made, has benefited from the fact that it was made
for no or an inadequate consideration, including consideration in the form of interest.
It is submitted that the term ‘income’ is used in the same context as that in
section 7 and therefore does not mean ‘income’ as defined in section 1 of the
Act, but that it is rather interpreted as being commercial revenue profits. ‘Capi-
tal gain’ is defined in the Eighth Schedule and that particular meaning is im-
plied.
The phrase ‘donation, settlement or other disposition’ again appears. It is
submitted that this phrase has the same meaning as that provided in parts 2 and
3 above. This means that only the income and capital gain attributable to the
gratuitous element of the donation, settlement or other disposition are consid-
ered in terms of this paragraph.
The implication of the preamble to paragraph 73 is that only assets from
which income and capital gains are derived by reason of a donation, settlement
or other disposition can be considered in terms of this paragraph. Therefore
assets that yield no income, e.g. Krugerrands or assets that have no capital
growth such as a fixed deposit in respect of which the interest income is not
capitalised, are excluded from the scope of the paragraph. It is not known
whether this was the intention of the legislature. The exclusion of these types of
assets may appear inequitable, but the words of Lord Cairns in the oft-quoted
case of Partington v The Attorney-General4 should be borne in mind, namely
that:
If a person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, how-
ever great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be.
Paragraph 73 is clear that both income and capital gains should be present in the
same year of assessment before the provisions of the paragraph apply. For the
purposes of this paper, it is accepted that paragraph 73 applies only in cases in
which both income and capital gains are attributable to a donation, settlement or
other disposition.
In terms of paragraph 73, the amount of income and capital gains to be lim-
ited by the paragraph is the sum of the income that is attributable in terms of
section 7 plus the capital gains attributable in terms of Part X of the Eighth
Schedule (i.e. paragraphs 68 to 72). The amount of income to be added to the
capital gains is provided as being the amount:
________________________
4 Cited in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v George Forest Timber Company Limited
[1924] 1 SATC 20 at 29
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that is deemed in terms of section 7 to be that of a person other than the one to whom it
accrues or by whom it is received or for whose benefit it is expended or accumulated.
The amount that is deemed in terms of section 7 is the amount of income to be
deemed ‘by reason of’ or ‘in consequence of’ the donation, settlement or other
disposition. Because the amount that is deemed to be that of the donor should be
determined before the application of the Eighth Schedule, it is submitted that the
decision in Woulidge should be applied to such income. In the case of an inter-
est-free loan, the income to be added to the capital gains for the purposes of
paragraph 73 may therefore already be limited in terms of case law.
The amount of capital gains to be added to the income in terms of sub-
paragraph (a) of paragraph 73(1) is provided as being the amount:
that is attributed in terms of this Part to a person other than the one in whom it vests.
It is stated in part 3 above that the amount of the capital gain that is attributed in
terms of paragraphs 68 to 72 can only be the portion of the capital gain that is
attributable to the donation, settlement or other disposition. In the case of the
sale of an asset at market value on an interest-free loan, it is stated that, in terms
of the preferred interpretation of the paragraphs, no capital gain attribution may
occur, because the capital was replaced in full. Should this be the case, para-
graph 73 has no application, because no capital gain is attributable in terms of
paragraphs 68 to 72 and therefore no capital gain may be added to any income
that is attributed in terms of section 7.
The following example provides an illustration of the preferred interpretation
of the paragraphs on attribution on the sale of an asset at market value on an
interest-free loan account:
J sells a rent-producing property to a discretionary trust that has been created
in favour of his minor children. The property is sold at its market value of
R2 000 000 on an interest-free loan account on 1 October 2001. On 28 February
2003, the trust sells the property for R3 000 000. The rental yield on the prop-
erty is 13% per annum. A market-related interest rate for the loan account is
16%. The year end of the trust is the last day of February. All the income earned
by the trust was distributed equally to the two minor children. There are three
independent trustees, apart from J, and J does not have any power over the
majority decision of the trustees (who each have equal voting power).
Year ended 28 February 2002
Total rental income earned by the trust and distributed to the minor
children (R2m x 13% x 5/12) 108 333
Maximum attributable to J s 7(3) is the lesser of:
Actual income 108 333
Notional interest (R2m x 16% x 5/12) 133 333
Income deemed to be J’s 108 333
Excess notional interest is disregarded (see part 2 read with part 3) 25 000D
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Year ended 28 February 2003
Total income earned by the trust and distributed to minor children
(R2m x 13%) 260 000
Maximum attributable to J s 7(3)
Actual income 260 000
Notional interest (R2m x 16%) 320 000
Capital gain (R3m – R2 m) 1 000 000
Attributable to J para 69 (refer to the preceding discussion) 0
Excess notional interest is disregarded (see part 2 read with part 3) 60 000
Paragraph 73 has no application, because no capital gain is attributable in terms
of paragraph 69.
The question is therefore whether paragraph 73 has any application for trans-
actions other than the sale of an asset at market value on an interest-free loan
account, such as the donation of an asset.
If an asset is donated, there is no notional interest to apply. The entire trans-
action is gratuitous and therefore, it is submitted, all the income that is earned
on the asset that was donated is attributable back to the donor, if the provisions
of section 7 apply. The capital would also not have been replaced (as the asset
was disposed of without any consideration being payable or owing). It is there-
fore submitted that the entire capital gain is attributable to the donation and as
such it would be attributable back to the donor of the asset, if the provisions of
paragraphs 68 to 72 apply.
Should both income and capital gains be attributable in terms of the above
example, the amounts would be aggregated and it would be left to paragraph 73
to determine the limit to be applied.
The benefit (being the limit) is defined in paragraph 73(2) as:
the amount by which the person to whom that donation, settlement or other disposition
was made, has benefited from the fact that it was made for no or an inadequate considera-
tion, including consideration in the form of interest.
Upon the donation of an asset, the beneficiary (or recipient) benefits from both
the income and the capital as a result of the fact that no consideration is payable.
It would appear therefore that paragraph 73 does not limit the attribution of
income or capital in a case of this nature. It is not correct to limit the attribution
in the case of a donation, because neither the income nor the capital have been
replaced, which results in the entire transaction being gratuitous.
It is submitted that the phrase ‘including consideration in the form of interest’
was designed to include the gratuitous portion of dispositions, such as interest-
free loans, in cases in which, for example, assets are sold to trusts at full consid-
eration. It is debatable whether paragraph 73(2) makes the interest that is for-
gone applicable to both income and capital. It is submitted that by adding
income to the capital gain in paragraph 73, the legislature’s intention could have
been to merely provide the mechanism with which to limit the attribution of
income and not necessarily to apply the interest that is forgone to the attribution
of capital. It is submitted that the interest that is forgone should only be used to
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determine the attribution of income and should not be applied to capital gain.
The best illustration of the application of the principles discussed above is that
of a sale on an interest-free loan account at inadequate consideration.
The interpretation stated above does, however, differ from that which SARS
holds regarding paragraph 73.
6 SARS’ application of paragraph 73
The extract that follows has been taken from the Draft Comprehensive Guide on
Capital Gains Tax, which was prepared by SARS. The extract provides insight
into the way in which SARS interprets paragraph 73. Commentary on this
interpretation follows the extract.
Where an amount of income as well as a capital gain has been derived from or is attribut-
able to a donation, settlement or other disposition made by a person, the amount of that
income as well as that capital gain might be subject to the attribution rules embodied in s 7
and paras 68 to 72, respectively. This might result in the taxation of both amounts in the
hands of the person who made the donation, settlement or other disposition. Paragraph 73
limits the total amount of the income and gain that can be taxed in the hands of that person
to the amount of the benefit derived from that donation, settlement or other disposition by
the person to whom it was made. The quantified benefit to the latter person from, for ex-
ample, an interest-free or low interest loan will therefore determine the extent to which any
resulting income and capital gain can be attributed to the person who provided that benefit.
Example 1 – Attribution of income and capital gain
On 1 July 1997 Wayne sold a residential building to the Wayne Family Trust for
R1 000 000. The purchase price was funded by means of an interest free loan
from Wayne. Had the trust funded the acquisition by obtaining a bond from a
bank it would have paid interest at the rate of 15% per annum. The market value
of the property on valuation date was R1 200 000, and this was adopted by the
trust as the valuation date value. On 28 February 2003 the trust sold the property
for R1 500 000 and reinvested the funds in another project. The trust did not
distribute any portion of the capital gain to the beneficiaries of the trust. The
following is a summary of the net rental income derived by the trust, the amount
deemed back to Wayne in terms of s 7(5) and the balance that could not be
deemed back because the income was insufficient.
The maximum amount that can be attributed back each year is R1 000 000 x
15% = R150 000.
Year ended
28 February
Net rental
income
Amount deemed
back to Wayne in
terms of s 7(5)
Shortfall (R150 000 –
amount deemed back
in terms of s 7(5))
1998 95 000 95 000 55 000
1999 100 000 100 000 50 000
2000 105 000 105 000 45 000
2001 110 000 110 000 40 000
2002 110 000 110 000 40 000
2003 120 000 120 000 30 000
260 000
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The capital gain derived by the trust is:
R
Proceeds 1 500 000
Base cost 1 200 000
Capital gain 300 000
The portion of this gain to be attributed to Wayne in terms of para 73 is
R260 000. The remaining R40 000 will be taxed in the trust. The period before
the introduction of CGT is only taken into account for the purpose of determin-
ing in whose hands the gain must be taxed. The gain itself, however, relates
entirely to the post-CGT period and there is, therefore, no question of retrospec-
tive taxation’.
The amount of the capital gain attributed in the example provided by SARS is
an accumulation of ‘unused limits’ from previous years. It is believed that
SARS’s rationale in this regard is that if the borrower should default in an
economic transaction that is based on the normal commercial terms, the capital
would have to be liquidated to fund the payment of interest. Because the capital
asset did not have to be liquidated, the notional interest that was not ‘paid’
creates a capital benefit. It is submitted that the above rationale is incorrect for
the reasons that follow.
It can be inferred from court decisions that all the normal commercial princi-
ples do not apply in transactions of this nature. For example, Froneman AJA
(2001:489) stated that:
the in duplum rule can only be applied in the real world of commerce and economic activ-
ity where it serves considerations of public policy in the protection of borrowers against
exploitation by lenders.
As illustrated in part 3 above, Froneman AJA extended this principle by pro-
viding that when normal commercial principles were to be applied to an inter-
est-free loan to determine the extent of the gratuitous element, the normal
commercial principle would assume a lender who insists on the payment of the
interest and a borrower who is able to meet such payments. It was therefore
submitted that the inference that could be drawn from this comment is that,
firstly, there is no capitalisation of notional interest and, secondly, in assuming a
borrower who is able to pay the interest charged by a lender, a natural extension
of the assumption is that the asset would not be sold to meet such interest
payments. Should the sale of the asset not be required in order to meet the
interest payments, no capital gain could be attributed to the interest that is
forgone. Therefore, in the example above, there should not have been an accu-
mulation of the excess interest that was forgone over the actual income derived
from the asset that was sold on an interest-free loan account.
Furthermore, the principles derived from Joss and Ovenstone appear to be
clear. The extent to which the income and/or asset has not been replaced represents
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the extent of the gratuity. Therefore in the case of a sale of an asset on an
interest-free loan, the asset has been replaced in its entirety. Only the income
has not been replaced. The disposition is only gratuitous to the extent of the
interest that is not charged, which, it should be noted, relates only to the
income of the asset and not the capital. No attribution can be made with regard
to any capital gain on the asset, because there is no gratuitous element with
regard to the sale, whereas the income can be attributed to the extent that the
income is not replaced, but limited by notional interest on the balance of the
outstanding loan.
The method proposed by SARS, while presented in simplified form in their
example, places an onerous burden on the taxpayer in terms of record keeping
for any trust. The tax saving achieved will be outweighed by the employment of
specialists to keep track of the movements with regard to the various assets year
on year (West and Surtees 2002:293). The proposed legislation in part 7 at-
tempts to simplify the approach to yield a more logical and practical approach to
the determination of the limits of attribution.
It is therefore submitted that the interpretation advanced by SARS does not
take into consideration the order in which the legislative provisions are applied,
nor does it consider the implications of prevailing case law. The fact that the
definition of benefit in paragraph 73(2) includes the notional interest on the
outstanding loan balance does not necessarily mean that the interest that is
forgone should be applied to the capital gain. Rather, it is submitted, the interest
that is forgone, which is referred to in paragraph 73(2), was merely included to
be applied to the attribution of income, which is included in paragraph 73(1).
However, as indicated in part 5, the application of the interest that is forgone
would have occurred earlier in determining the amount to be included by sec-
tion 7 and therefore the amount of income for the purposes of paragraph 73(1).
The amount of the capital gain being attributed would also have been limited in
terms of paragraphs 68 to 72 prior to the inclusion of the attribution for the
purposes of paragraph 73(1).
It is submitted that much of the difficulty experienced in respect of paragraph
73 stems from the attempt to determine a single limit that is to be applied to
both income and capital.
7 Potential revision of legislation
Legislation could be enacted which provides a more logical and structured
approach to prescribing a limit for the attribution of income and capital gains.
Furthermore, it is submitted that the derivation of the limit should be split
between the income and the capital components. The insertion of a new sec-
tion 7(11) and the replacement of paragraph 73 by the following are proposed:Do
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Proposed section 7(11):
(a) Where income has been derived by reason of any donation, settlement or
other disposition, some or all of which will be deemed in terms of this sec-
tion to be that of the person who made the donation, settlement or other
disposition, such income deemed to accrue to that person shall be limited in
terms of the following formula.
[ ]BARI
M
CML ×−+


×
−
= )()(
where:
L is the maximum income to be deemed to be that of the person who made
the donation, settlement or other disposition.
M is the market value on the date that the asset was donated, settled or in
any other way transferred by the person who made the donation, settlement
or other disposition.
C is the consideration due on the date specified for M.
I is the total income that arises from the asset in the current year of assess-
ment.
R is a market-related interest rate for any loan account created on the
transfer of the donation, settlement or other disposition.
A is the interest rate charged on any loan account created on the transfer of
the donation, settlement or other disposition.
B is the outstanding balance on any loan account created on the transfer of
the donation, settlement or other disposition.
(b) For the purposes of the formula in (a), if L is greater than I, then L is
deemed to be equal to I.
(c) For the purposes of the formula in (a), if the market-related interest rate is
less than the actual interest rate that is charged, the result of R – A is
deemed to be nil.
The following wording is proposed to replace the current wording of para-
graph 73:
Where a capital gain is derived by reason of or is attributable to a donation,
settlement or other disposition, the amount of the capital gain that is to be
attributed in terms of this Part to a person other than the one in whom it vests
shall not exceed the amount determined by the following formula.
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xG
M
CML )( −=
where:
L is the limit to be determined for the attribution of the capital gain.
M is the market value on the date that the asset was donated, settled or in
any other way transferred by the person who made the donation, settle-
ment or other disposition.
C is the consideration due on the date specified for M.
G is the total capital gain that is determined for the asset that was origi-
nally donated, settled or in any other way transferred by the person who
made the donation, settlement or other disposition in the current year of
assessment.
It is submitted that the above proposed section and paragraph would provide a
logical and true reflection of the benefit obtained from the donation, settlement
or other disposition in terms of case law.
8 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that there is some difficulty in the interpretation of
paragraph 73 in its current form. It appears that the intention of the legislature
was to legislate the decision in Woulidge. However, the intended effect is not
achieved by combining the attribution of income and of capital in paragraph 73.
The intention of paragraph 73, as stated in the Explanatory Memorandum,
namely to provide a limit in years in which both income and capital gains are to
be attributed in the same year, is noble and should be applauded. However, this
intention loses sight of the fact that the donor, had he not disposed of the asset,
would have both received the income and accounted for the capital gain in the
year of assessment in which the asset was disposed of and would not have been
provided with any legislative relief.
The approach adopted by SARS ignores the principles derived from case law,
which results in an inappropriate interpretation of the legislation. It has been
repeatedly demonstrated in the courts that an inappropriate interpretation or
practice with regard to the legislation adopted by SARS would be dismissed if
the courts were of the opinion that such interpretation or practice did not cor-
rectly reflect the law (see, for example, Frith’s Estate case in which the courts
dismissed a 60 year old practice of SARS; or Ernst’s case in which the court
issued a warning against the use of a practice of SARS as being the interpreta-
tion of the Act). Although the interpretation adopted by SARS may yield more
favourable results for the taxpayer in limited circumstances, it is submitted that
the interpretation adopted by SARS would be dismissed in favour of an inter-
pretation that is based on prevailing legal precedent. It is therefore proposed in
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this paper that the legislature should separate the application of a limit for
income and for capital gains to achieve a more logical and equitable approach.
Such an approach would also simplify the determination of the limit that is to be
applied.
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